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ABSTRACT The rapid development of mobile internet technology and the better availability of GPS have
made mobile online social networks (mOSNs) more popular than traditional online social networks (OSNs)
over the last few years. They necessitate fundamental social operations such as establishing friend relation-
ship, location sharing among friends, and providing location-based services. As a consequence, security and
privacy issues demands the utmost importance to mOSNs users. The first stream of existing solutions adopts
two different servers to store locations-based and social network-based information separately, thereby
sustaining large storage and communication overhead. The second stream of solutions aims at integrating the
social network server and the location-based server into a single entity. However, as these approaches exploit
only one single server, they may face several performance issues related to server bottlenecks. Moreover,
such schemes are found to be vulnerable to various active and passive security attacks. In this paper,
we propose a privacy preserving, secure and efficient location sharing scheme for mOSNs, which shows both
efficiency and flexibility in the location update, sharing, and query of social friends and social strangers.
The security of the proposed scheme is validated using random oracle based formal security proof and
Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic based authentication proof, followed by informal security analysis.
Additionally, we have used ProVerif 1.93 to verify the security of the system. The efficiency and practicability
of the proposed scheme are demonstrated through experimental implementation and evaluation.
INDEX TERMS Mobile online social networks, privacy, location sharing and query, BAN logic, random
oracle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancement of mobile internet technology over the
last few years have shifted online social networks (OSNs)
users towards its more flexible and dynamic version, namely
mobile online social network (mOSNs). In general, mobile
users keep their mobile devices in online mode anytime,
anywhere. This allows the mobile device to use the current
location information, thereby providing support to a range
of location-based services such as current location sharing,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Young Jin Chun .
social friend or stranger’s location query, etc. Nowadays,
mOSNs users can use location-based services to recommend
good social friend, search various intended Points of Inter-
ests (PoIs) such as restaurants, movie halls and hospitals.
Online Social Networks (OSN) is an online platformwhich
people use to build social networks or social relationships
with other people who share similar personal or career inter-
ests and activities [1]. Normally, people use PC or laptop to
use and access online social network services.
Mobile online social networking (mOSN) involves the
interactions between participants with similar interests and
objectives through their mobile devices and/or tablet within
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virtual social networks [1]. mOSN leverages mobile commu-
nication networks and social networks, asmobile applications
can use existing social networks. In mOSN, social networks
can take advantage of mobile features and ubiquitous acces-
sibility. Moreover, an mOSN can readily exploit mobile net-
works to support the concept of real-time web [2], which is
at the forefront of the emerging trends in social networking.
mOSNs enhance conventional social networks with addi-
tional features, such as location-awareness, tagmedia [3], etc.
mOSNs can take advantage of the additional capabilities of
modern mobile devices such as smartphones or tablets. Peo-
ple can access mOSNs applications anywhere and anytime.
These capabilities, such as global position system (GPS)
receiver, sensing modules (cameras, sensors, etc.), and
multiple radios (third/fourth generation cellular, WiFi, Blue-
tooth, WiFi Direct, etc.), enable mOSNs to enhance con-
ventional social networks with additional features, such as
location-awareness [5], location-based service, the ability to
capture and tag media [3]. In general built-in GPS is not
that much available in laptops. Moreover, it does not exploit
4G or the current standard of cellular networks. Hence,
location-based services cannot be accessed using laptops [1].
Location sharing through mOSN may end up in
catastrophic failure, especially when privacy and security
measures are not implemented properly. On the one hand,
the popularity and usage of mOSN based applications are
increasing every day. On the other hand, different malicious
users and attackers continuously engineer innovative attacks
to unlawfully access and modify various social and physical
information of the registered mOSN users. The implementa-
tion of a secured, privacy-preserving location sharing strategy
while sustaining the modern-day facilities of various mOSN
applications is a serious research challenge.
Detail security analysis reveals the vulnerability of the
existing related schemes against many security attacks, such
as the denial-of-service (DoS) attack [6], replay attack [6], [7]
and privileged insider attack [6], [7]. A recent study reveals
that two attacking tricks, namely Regional Statistical Attack
(RSA) [8] and Long-term Statistical Attack (LSA) [8], give
more opportunity to the attackers.
In this paper, we propose a new location sharing scheme
for mobile online social network applications, in which
the limitations of the earlier schemes concerning secu-
rity and functionality are overcome. The proposed system
adopts a model, where the social network server (SNS)
and the location-based server (LBS) are integrated into one
single entity. To share privacy-preserving locations, the pro-
posed scheme exploits dummy locations, a dedicated map-
ping protocol among the Cellular Tower (CT) and a set
of location-storing social network servers. Various security
attacks including the strong replay attack, man-in-the-middle
attack, etc., which are prevalent in existing schemes, can be
successfully overcome by our scheme.
Formal security validation of the proposed scheme is
achieved through ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool. The Real-
or-Random (ROR) model based on the random oracle model
is employed to verify the security of the proposed scheme for-
mally.Moreover, BAN logic is used to prove authentication of
the proposed system. We logically explain how the proposed
scheme defends various active and passive security attacks
by analyzing it informally. Experimental implementation and
evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency and practicality
of the proposed scheme.
Our study shows that although modern smartphones have
privacy and security-based location sharing features, those
services requires improvements in the security aspects. More-
over, in current systems, location sharing to a large number
of friends may incur substantial security hazards.
First, although popular online social networks provide
many facilities to social life, they also increase the danger
of user privacy breaches due to direct and indirect location
sharing. A few studies have attempted to address the loca-
tion privacy issues in MSNs [9]–[11]. Recently, H. Li et al.
presented an empirical research to quantify private informa-
tion leaking issues arising from location sharing in popular
OSNs such as Facebook and Twitter [12]. They conducted
a three-week real-world experiment with 30 participants, and
discovered that direct and indirect location sharing by popular
OSNs could reveal 16% and 33% of the users’ real points
of interest (POIs) respectively. External adversary was able
to attack to infer the demographics (e.g., age, gender, edu-
cation) after observing the exposed users’ location profiles.
H. Li et al. implemented such an attack in a large real-world
dataset involving 22,843 mobile users [12]. Many popular
social networks provide location-based sharing functional-
ities like geolocation tags and check-in services. Based on
these functionalities, the attacker can easily obtain the loca-
tion information shared by the mobile users by crawling the
interested information from web pages and extracting POIs
from the collected data [10], [13].
Second, It is possible for a privileged insider to exe-
cute location spoofing intentionally, providing fake locations
on the location-based features of Facebook, WhatsApp and
Snapchat (e.g. Nearby Friends and Snap Map). This is done
using downloadable apps like FakeGPS, in order to deceive
the social friends for malicious purpose [14].
Third, sharing location information is less safe especially
when a person has large number of friends or followers whom
he/she might not actually know. Location sharing and friend’s
location query should be done on a restricted basis where
the communicating parties can limit the distance threshold
by which they can find each other.
In this paper, we address above security drawbacks of the
existing location-based features by popular OSNs. Accord-
ing to our proposed scheme, MUi and LSSNS first sepa-
rately establish a shared symmetric session key with CT . All
location updates and friend’s location query messages are
encrypted with this session key before transmission. Because
of this end-to-end encryption, an adversaryA has little chance
to reveal the location information of MUi. Furthermore,
unlike the location-based services of existing OSNs, our pro-
posed scheme allows a user to decide a distance threshold,
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up to which he/she wants to make himself/herself visible to
the social friends. This imposes a much better user controlled
restriction on location sharing, as unrestricted location shar-
ing can lead to security vulnerabilities.
A. MOTIVATION
The factors that motivated us to envisage the proposed
scheme explained in this paper are as follows.
1) In order to achieve efficiency, the communication cost
between the social network server (SNS) and the
location-based server (LBS) should be as little as pos-
sible. Moreover, less message exchange would give an
attacker less exposure to execute attacks in a wireless
public channel.
2) The Location sharing mechanism should not depend
on a third-party location-based server. This should be
done to minimize the chance of privacy leakage and to
minimize the establishment cost.
3) The location-based server (LBS) must not be able to
discover the topological structures of users’ social net-
work. By collusion with the social network server, LBS
should not be able to reveal users’ social information.
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The following contributions are made in this paper:
1) The location sharing scheme of the proposed scheme
does not depend on any third-party location-based
server. This eliminates the possibility of LBS to reveal
the social network topology structure of a social user.
2) The proposed scheme integrates LBS and SNS into
a set of single entity servers, thereby reducing their
internal communication overhead.
3) The proposed scheme has the ability to resist various
active and passive security attacks which are present in
the existing schemes.
4) The location sharing mechanism is efficient,
lightweight and secure. We avoid computation costly
operations like bilinear pairing, elliptic curve cryp-
tography, public key infrastructure (PKI), public key
cryptography.
5) On top of informal security analysis, we validate secu-
rity of the proposed scheme through formal security
verification using random oracle, and through security
simulation using ProVerif 1.93.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines
the existing work in brief. Section III discusses mathemat-
ical preliminaries, which are necessary to set up the pro-
posed scheme. The system architecture and threat model
is explained in Section IV. Section V presents the pro-
posed location sharing scheme for multiserver architecture
in mOSNs. Section VI provides various formal security
proofs along with informal security analysis. Section VII
presents security validation using ProVerif 1.93 simulation
tool. Section VIII presents the computation and communica-
tion cost of the proposed scheme. Section IX presents a per-
formance and security comparison of the proposed scheme
with the other related existing schemes. Finally, Section X
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the field of mOSNs, privacy and security issues have
attracted a great deal of research focus. Hence, in recent years,
many of privacy-preserving schemes have been proposed
with their ownmerits and limitations. Earlier research focuses
on privacy preserving schemes aimed at the achievement of at
achievement of information privacy [15], user anonymity [16]
and protection of location privacy [17].
In order to sustain location anonymity, a mobile device
encrypts the current location before sending it to servers.
K-anonymity for location privacy adopts the process of obfus-
cating the actual location of the user as proposed and used
by [18] and [19]. The use of dummy location along with the
real location is the next approach for location anonymity [20].
Location encryption is another very effective way to achieve
location privacy protection [21]. The pseudonym meth-
ods [22], [23], mix zones [24] and the m-unobservability [25]
are some well know schemes developed in the past. Rah-
man et al. obtained location obscurity through privacy context
obfuscation based on various location parameters [26].
Location sharing while maintaining privacy protection in
online social networks has been first primarily addressed
in 2007 by SmokeScreen [27], which allowed sharing
locations between social friends and strangers. Wei et al.
enhanced this scheme and proposed Mobishare, where
users’ social and location information were separately stored
into SNS and LBS respectively [28]. Mobishare suffers
from the weakness that, in the query phrase, LBS can
reveal the topology structure of social networks of a user.
Recently, Li et al. [29] enhanced Mobishare to propose
new privacy-protected location-sharing scheme in mOSNs,
namely MobiShare+, which introduced the concept of
dummy queries and private set intersection to prevent LBS
from knowing social information of a user. BMobiShare is a
improved version over MobiShare+ in terms of transmission
efficiency, where the existing private set intersection method
is replaced by Bloom Filter [30]. However, the computation
cost of BMobiShare is quite high.
In 2015, in order to improve privacy-protection against the
insider attack, Li et al. introduced a multiple location server
based location sharing system [31]. Although it provides
higher security, it is resource-demanding and time-inefficient.
As these schemes rely on the third-party location server,
they associate the chance of LBS to collude with SNS in
order to reveal the social information. Also, they incur a
high transmission and storage cost [28], [29], [32], [33], [30].
To address this issue, very recently, Xiao et al. proposed
CenLocShare [34], where SNS and LBS were amalgamated
into one single server. This scheme reduces communication
cost, storage cost and also increases user’s privacy protection.
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Remark 1: The implementation of end-to-end encryption
is an open research problem to many popular OSNs.
The CEO of Facebook has recently published an article
‘‘A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking’’, which
claims that the OSN giant is planning to implement end-
to-end encryption on all its messaging services to increase
privacy levels, and it has started experimenting with end-
to-end encryption already [35]. The lack of privacy in OSNs
leads to various security hazards like the identity theft,
information leakage, and government impinge on user pri-
vacy [36]. However, the proposed scheme does not aim at
providing complete end-to-end encryption on all messages
between mobile user and the social media service provider.
The idea proposed in this paper serves three basic pur-
poses. First, it provides centralized storage of location-based
information and social information into single entity [34].
Second, it ensures secure communication of location sharing
and update based messages, thus protecting them from vari-
ous malicious attackers. Finally, for location sharing, it facil-
itates a low computation and communication cost on mobile
device, as it avoids encryption via public key infrastructure
(PKI). These make the proposed scheme suitable for practical
environments.
We find that existing centralized location sharing of the
scheme suffer from the man-in-the-middle attack, replay
attack, and DoS attack [37]. Our contribution is to secure
location sharing and location query based messages and to
protect them from adversary. We do not exploit direct key
sharing between the user and the service provider. As shown
in Figure 3, MUi goes through a three-factor authentication
process with CT , and establish the session key SKMUi,CT
(= SKCT ,MUi ), shared with CT . All location-based messages
between MUi and CT are encrypted with this key. Similarly,
Figure 4 shows how CT and LSSNS authenticate and estab-
lish their shared session key SKSj,CT (= SKCT ,Sj ).
III. MATHEMATICAL FUNDAMENTALS
To describe our proposed scheme, we have applied the
collision-resistant one-way hash function [38], Chebyshev
polynomial [39], [40], biometrics and fuzzy extractor, bitwise
XOR operator. In this section, we describe these fundamental
concepts in brief.
A. THE COLLISION-RESISTANT ONE-WAY HASH
FUNCTION
The input to a one-way cryptographic hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k is any string of 0 and 1. That is,
s ∈ {0, 1}∗. The output of the function is another binary
string H (s) ∈ {0, 1}k whose length is fixed k bits. The
property of collision-resistant of H (·) is described in the
following [41].
Definition 1: The advantage probability of any adversary
A’s to find any collision with the execution time tn is denoted
and defined by AdvHASHA (tn) = Pr[(p, q) ∈R A: p 6= q and
H (p) = H (q)], where Pr[M ] is the probability of an event
M and an adversary A selects a random pair (p, q). By an
(ε, tn)-adversary A attacks the collision resistance of H (·),
it specify that the computation time of A is at most tn and
that AdvHASHA (tn) ≤ ε.
B. THE CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL: DEFINITION AND
PROPERTIES
The Chebyshev polynomial Tn(x) : [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] of
degree n is defined as [39]:
Tn(x) =
{
cos(n · arccos(x)) if x ∈ [−1, 1]
cos(nθ ) if x = cosθ, θ ∈ [0, π].




1 when n is equal to 0
x when n is equal to 1
when n is greater
2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x) than or equal to 2.
Definition 2: The semi-group property of the enhanced
Chebyshev polynomial holds on the interval (−∞,+∞) and
is defined as follows [42]. Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x) − Tn−2(x)
(mod p), where n ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞,+∞), and p is a
large prime number. Here, Tr (Ts(x)) ≡ Trs(x) ≡ Ts(Tr (x))
(mod p), where Z∗p = {a|0 < a < p, gcd(a, p) = 1}
= {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
Definition 3: For any given x and y, it is computationally
infeasible to find an integer s such that Ts(x) = y. It is referred
to as the Chaotic map-based discrete logarithm problem
(CMDLP) [43]. The advantage probability of A to solve
CMDLP is AdvCMDLPA (t2) = Pr[A(x, y) = r : r ∈ Z
∗
p , y =
Tr (x) (mod p)].
C. THE BIOMETRICS AND FUZZY EXTRACTOR
For secure authentication, various authentication protocols
use some biometrics features, such as iris and fingerprint
as the key for their uniqueness property [44], [45]. Using
the Fuzzy extractor technique, we can produce the identical
output string, though the input biometric will differ from the
stored biometric samples up to a given threshold limit for
permissible error tolerance. The Fuzzy extractor is defined
by two algorithms: Generate(·) and Reproduce(·), which are
deterministic and probabilistic.
Definition 4: Let us suppose that a biometric key of length n
bits is generated from the biometrics B. We also consider that
R = {0, 1}k is a metric space of finite dimensional biometric
data points. The following two functions are defined next.
• Generate: This function generates a pair (η, µ), where
η ∈ {0, 1}n represents the biometric key andµ is a public
value which is used as a parameter by the Reproduce
function for a given input B ∈ R.
• Reproduce:This function regenerates the original bio-
metric key η = Reproduce(Bi, µ), where η ∈ {0, 1}n
from the entered biometrics Bi and original biometrics
B and Bi are close in terms of some distance metric such
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FIGURE 1. The architecture for location sharing in the mOSN through multiserver system.
as the Hamming distance. To be close, this distance must
not to be more than E . E is a pre-defined threshold value.
IV. THE ADVERSARY MODEL AND SYSTEM MODEL
This section briefly describes the basic attack model or
adversary model applicable for our proposed scheme. More-
over, we depict the outline of the system model adopted for
our proposed location sharing scheme for the online social
network.
A. THE THREAT MODEL
We primarily assume that cellular tower (CT ) is a
trusted body and define the threat model concerning the
location-sharing social network servers (LSSNSs) and the user
(U ). We define the model below:
• Registered entities like U , LSSNS and CT communi-
cate through a public insecure wireless channel. The
proposed scheme adopts the widely-acceptedDolev-Yao
threat model (DY model) [46]. An attacker or a mali-
cious user has all the capabilities of executing all poten-
tial attacks defined in the classical DY model.
• A registered or authorized user or a privileged insider of
the system may turn into a malicious user, who illegally
intends to access various location or social information
of other genuine users.
• LSSNSs exhibit an ‘honest but curious’ nature. They
alone, or after colludingwith other servers, try to retrieve
the social network topology or location information of
other registered users.
• Our proposed scheme assumes CT to be a trusted entity.
B. THE SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 shows the basic system model of the proposed
scheme. Here, we define the basic entities, which are
described as follows:
• Mobile user (U ): Sends and responds to three types
of request queries. These include sharing of loca-
tion information to other social friends and strangers,
updating own location information and querying a
friend’s location information.
• Location Sharing Social Network Servers (LSSNS):
Responsible for storing, updating and informing various
location information of U .
• Cellular Tower (CT):: It is a trusted entity, which
receives, processes and forwards various messages of U
and LSSNS. All messages communicated betweenU and
LSSNS are communicated via CT .
The overall flow of the model is shown in Figure 1. First,
the mobile user and the Location Sharing Social Network
Server LSSNSj register to a cellular tower CT (process A).
This is a one-time operation and is executed through a secure
channel. Next, the mobile user MUi and LSSNSj make a
secure login to the registered CT and establish a shared
session key (processes B and C respectively). Thereafter,
the mobile user registers a distance threshold to LSSNSj via
CT , in which corresponding social friends can be searched
(process D). When required, the mobile user updates his/her
current location to LSSNSj through the cellular tower (process
E). Finally, the mobile user obtains his/her social friends’
identities and locations for those who are willing to share
their information from LSSNSj through the cellular tower
(process F).
In general, three major security challenges are primar-
ily faced by location sharing schemes designed for mOSN
applications. First, various location-based services must be
privacy-preserving. An attacker or malicious user must not
be able to access and/or modify personal information of U .
Second, to ensure user location privacy, LSSNS should store
various fake or dummy identities of U . Finally, a physical
distance threshold between U and friend or stranger of U
must be registered. A location query about U ’s friends or
strangers are processed only if their current physical distance
is within that predefined distance threshold.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In order to design the proposed scheme, various symbols are
used. The symbols and notations are tabulated in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. Symbols and notations used in the proposed scheme.
FIGURE 2. Message Communication in Registration Phase. Please refer to
Sections V-A1 and V-A2.
A. THE REGISTRATION PHASE
This phase involves two distinct registration processes,
namely, (a) the registration of a mOSN user (MUi) to
a cellular tower, and (b) the registration of a LSSNSj to
a cellular tower. The registration process is a one-time
operation that is executed through a secure channel;
the message communication for this phase is shown
in Figure 2.
1) MOBILE USER REGISTRATION
In this phase, a series of steps are executed for the regis-
tration of a mobile user MUi to the CT . These steps are as
follows.
Step UR1:
1) MUi selects own identity, password, and biometrics as
IDi, PWi, Bi respectively.
2) MUi selects parameters n and λ, which are two 128-bit
random numbers.
Step UR2:
1) MUi uses the fuzzy extractor (·) function to produce
(ηi, µi) = Generation(Bi) and computes the biometric
embedded password MPWBi = H (IDi|| H (PWi|| ηi
||n)).
2) Through a secure channel, MUi delivers its regis-
tration message {IDi, dfUi , dsUi , (MPWBi ⊕ λ)} to
the CT .
Note that IDi and PWi are randomized by concatenating
128-bit (16-byte) random numbers [43], [47], [48]. We mask
the user id and password as MPWBi = H (IDi|| H (PWi||
ηi ||n)). Thus, guessing of IDi and PWi from MPWBi is
infeasible, as it is computationally hard to guess three secrets
simultaneously. An 128-bit random number can generate
1038 possible values (as 2128 ≈ 1038). So, the guessing pos-




1) CT randomly selects its own 1024-bit master secret key
X0 .
2) For each 〈CT ↔ MUi〉 pair, CT randomly selects a
1024-bit secret key xCTUi .
3) CT computes AUiCT = H (H (IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||X0),
VCTUi = AUiCT ⊕MPWBi.
4) CT chooses its pseudo-identity as RID0 =
H (IDCT ||X0).
Step UR4:
1) CT provides an anonymous temporary identity for each
mOSN user MUi. This is done by selecting a random
but temporary identity TIDi for each userMUi.
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2) CT saves m 〈CT ↔ MUi〉 key-plus-id combinations
{TIDi, (IDCT , VCTUi , RID0) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} in mobile
device ofMUi.
Note that for all MUis, the CT saves the record
{IDi,TIDi, xCTUi } in own database.
Step UR5:
1) MUi computes P1i = H (PWi|| ηi) ⊕n and P
2
i = H (IDi
||PWi ||ηi ||n).
2) MUi modifies VCTUi as V
′
CTUi
= VCTUi ⊕λ, RIDi =
TIDi⊕ H (IDi ||V ′CTUi
) and RID′0 = RID0 ⊕ H (ηi||n)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.






RID′0〉 and removes VCTUi s, RID0 and TIDis from own
mobile device.
2) THE LOCATION SHARING SOCIAL NETWORK SERVER
REGISTRATION PHASE
Each location sharing social network server LSSNSj registers
to the cellular tower CT through the following steps:
Step SR1:
1) LSSNSj chooses own id and password as IDSj andPWSj .
2) It selects one random number b of 128-bit long.
Step SR2:
1) LSSNSj computes masked password RPWSj = H (IDSj
||PWSj ) and Cj = H (IDSj ||PWSj ||b).
2) LSSNSj submits 〈IDSj , Cj〉 to CT via a secure channel.
Step SR3:
1) CT uses its master secret key X0 and one random num-
ber r (128-bit) to compute Kj = H (H (IDSj ||X0) ⊕ r),
and E1 = Kj ⊕ Cj = Kj⊕ H (IDSj ||PWSj ||b).
2) CT embeds the parameters {E1,TX0 (Kj)} in memory of
each LSSNSj.
3) CT saves pair 〈IDSj , SNj, r〉 into its database, where
SNj is the identity or serial number of the server
LSSNSj.
Step SR4:
1) LSSNSj computes E2 = RPWSj ⊕ b and fSj =
H (RPWSj ||b).
2) LSSNSj stores E2, fSj , H (·) into its own memory.
The Summary of registration process of MUi and LSSNSj
to CT is shown in Figure 3.
B. THE mOSN USER LOGIN, AUTHENTICATION AND KEY
ESTABLISHMENT PHASE
The mOSN user MUi makes a secure login to the registered
CT and establishes a shared session key through the following
steps:
Step ULA1:
1) MUi inputs own identity, password, and biomer-
ics (noisy) as IDi, PWi, and B′i respectively.
2) Using stored µi and P1i , MUi computes ηi =




FIGURE 3. The Registration phases of MUi and LSSNSj in the proposed
scheme.
3) MUi calculates H (IDi ||PWi ||n′ ||ηi) and compares
with stored P2i .
4) If the verification succeeds, go to Step ULA2, else, exit.
Step ULA2:
1) MUi randomly generates ui (128-bit number).
2) Using stored paratemer V ′CTUi
, MUi computes:
a) MPWBi = H (IDi|| H (PWi|| n′ ||ηi)).




c) M1 = AUiCT⊕ ui⊕ Tui⊕ H (IDCT ).
d) TIDi = RIDi ⊕ H (IDi|| V ′CTUi
).
e) TID∗i = TIDi⊕ H (IDCT || Tui )
3) MUi uses the current login timestamp Tui and computes
a hash value H1 = H (IDi||M1|| ui || Tui ).
4) Through a public channel,MUi sends {TID∗i ,M1, H1,
Tui} to CT .
Step ULA3:
1) CT verifies if |T ∗ui −Tui |
?
≤1T . If verification holds go
to step 2, else exit.
2) CT calculates TIDi = TID∗i⊕ H (IDCT ||Tui ).
3) Corresponding to calculated TIDi, CT finds the record
〈{IDi, xCTUi }〉 from own database.
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4) CT computes BCTUi = H (H (IDi ⊕ xCTUi )||X0).
5) CT computes P1 =M1 ⊕ Tui ⊕ H (IDCT ) ⊕ BCTUi =
ui .
Note that CT obtaines P1 of step (5), as AUiCT = BCTUi =
H (H (IDi⊕ xCTUi )|| X0).
Step ULA4:
1) CT uses received parameters to prepares a hash value
H2 = H (IDi ||M1 ||P1 ||Tui ).
2) CT verifies if H2
?
= H1. If verification holds go to step
3, else exit.
3) CT saves the record 〈IDi, ui , Tui〉 in its database.
4) CT generates a 128-bit random number ct .
5) CT computesM2 = BCTUi⊕ct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi. Here Tct
is the current timestamp of CT .
6) CT computes shared session key SKCT ,MUi = H (IDi
||IDCT ||BCTUi ||P1 ||ct ||Tui ||Tct ).
7) CT prepares hash value H3 = H (IDi ||P1 ||ct ||Tui
||Tct ||SKCT ,MUi ).
8) Through public channel, CT sends authentication
response message {M2, H3, Tct } to MUi.
Step ULA5:
1) MUi receives an authentication response message from
step 8 of ULA4.
2) MUi verifies the transmission delay by comparing
received and current timestamps. Go to step 3, if veri-
fication holds, else exit .
3) MUi computes P2 =M2 ⊕ Tct ⊕ IDi ⊕ AUiCT = ct .
Note that we obtain P2 of step (3), as AUiCT = BCTUi =
H (H (IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||X0).
Step ULA6
1) MUi generates a session key (mutually shared withCT )
as SKMUi,CT = H (IDi ||IDCT ||AUiCT ||ui ||P2 ||Tui
||Tct ).
2) MUi computes final hash value H4 = H (IDi ||ui ||P2
||Tui ||Tct ||SKMUi,CT ).
3) If H4
?
= H3, then MUi confirms that the session
key SKMUi,CT (= SKCT ,MUi ) is mutually verified and
established. Else, MUi discards the session key and
terminates the process.
For all message communicaions in the current session,
MUi and CT use this key for message encryption.
The Summary of mOSN user login, authentication
and key establishment phase with CT is shown in Fig-
ure 5 and the message communications of Login,
Authentication and Key Establishment Phase is shown
in Figure 4.
C. THE LSSNSj LOGIN, AUTHENTICATION AND KEY
ESTABLISHMENT PHASE
The LSSNSj makes a secure login to the registered cellular
tower CT and establishes a shared session key through the
following steps:
Step SLA1:
1) LSSNSj inputs own id IDSj and password PWSj .
FIGURE 4. Message Communication in Login, Authentication and Key
Establishment Phase. Please refer to Sections V-B and V-C.
2) LSSNSj generates RPW1 = H (IDSj ||PWSj ) and b1 =
E2⊕ PWB1.
3) LSSNSj uses generated b1 and computes f ′Sj = H (RPW1
||b1).
4) LSSNSj verifies if fSj
?
= f ′Sj . If verification holds, go to
step SLA2, else exit.
Step SLA2:
1) LSSNSj computes C = E1⊕ H (IDSj || PWSj ||b1).
2) LSSNSj generates random number sj.
3) LSSNSj computes Tsj (C).
4) LSSNSj computes K1 = Tsj (TX0 (C)).
Step SLA3:
1) LSSNSj generates 128-bit random number sj .
2) LSSNSj computes R1 = C⊕ sj⊕ Tsj (C)⊕ TSj . Here,
TSj is the current timestamp of LSSNSj.
3) LSSNSj generates its pseudo identity PIDSj = IDSj ⊕
H (K1).
4) LSSNSj computesMSj = H (IDSj || C ||K1 ||sj || TSj )
5) Finally, through a public channel, LSSNSj sends its
login request {PIDSj , Tsj (C),R1,MSj , TSj} to the cellu-
lar tower CT .
Step SLA4:
1) CT receives login message and verifies if |T ∗Sj − TSj |
?
≤ 1T . If verification holds go to step 2, else exit. Here,
T ∗Sj is the current timestamp.
2) CT calculates K ′1 = TX0 (Tsj (C)).
3) CT calculates ID′Sj = PIDSj ⊕H (K
′
1) = IDSj ⊕H (K1)
⊕H (K ′1) = IDSj .
4) CT verifies if K ′1
?
= K1. If verification holds, CT
ensures that ID′Sj = IDSj and go to step 5.
5) CT finds the record 〈IDSj , SNj, r〉 in the database.
6) CT further computes C ′ = H (H (ID′Sj ||X0)⊕ r).
7) CT computes R2 = R1⊕ TSj⊕ C ′⊕ Tsj (C) =
H (H (IDSj ||X0) ⊕r) ⊕sj ⊕TSj ⊕Tsj (C)) ⊕TSj
⊕H (H (IDSj ||X0) ⊕r) ⊕Tsj (C) = sj .
8) CT uses the received parameters TSj and calculates
R3 = H (ID′Sj ||C
′
||K ′1||R2||TSj ).
9) CT verifies whetherR3
?
= R2.
10) On successful verification, CT accepts the login
request and considers the Location Server LSSNSj as
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FIGURE 5. mOSN user login, authentication and key establishment phase in the proposed scheme.
authentic. Otherwise, CT terminates the session and
exit .
Step SLA5:
1) CT selects a 128-bit random number CT .
2) CT computes R4 = C ′⊕ CT⊕ TCT = H (H (IDSj
||X0)⊕r)⊕CT ⊕TCT . Here, TCT is the current times-
tamp of CT .
3) CT computes the mutually shared session key
SKCT ,Sj = H (C
′
|| K ′1|| TSj || TCT ||R2|| CT ).
4) CT computes MCT = H (IDSj || SKCT ,Sj || R2|| CT ||
TSj || TCT ).
5) Through a public channel, CT sends the authentication
response message {R4,MCT ,TCT } to
LSSNSj.
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FIGURE 6. The LSSNSj login, authentication and key establishment
phases of the proposed scheme.
Step SLA6:
1) LSSNSj receives the authentication response message
from CT .
2) LSSNSj verifies the transmission delay |T ∗CT − TCT |
?
≤
1T , where T ∗CT is the current timestamp. If verification
holds, go to step 3, else exit.
3) LSSNSj computes R5 = C ′⊕ R4⊕ TCT = H (H (ID′Sj
||X0) ⊕r) ⊕H (H (IDSj ||X0) ⊕r) ⊕CT ⊕TCT ⊕TCT
= CT .
Step SLA7:
1) LSSNSj generates the session key mutually shared with
CT as SKSj,CT = H (C ||K1 ||TSj ||TCT ||CT ||R5).
2) LSSNSj verifies MCT
?
= H (IDSj ||SKSj,CT ||CT ||R5
||TSj ||TCT ).
3) If verification succeeds, LSSNSj confirms that the cel-
lular tower CT is authentic and the current session key
SKSj,CT (= SKCT ,Sj ) is mutually verified and estab-
lished. Otherwise, discard the session key and exit.
The summary of the LSSNSj login, authentication and key
establishment phase is shown in Figure 6.
FIGURE 7. Message Communication in Distance Threshold Registration
Phase refer to Section V-D.
D. THE DISTANCE THRESHOLD REGISTRATION PHASE
Every registered mOSN userMUi needs to register a distance
threshold to LSSNSj in which corresponding social friends
can be searched and themessage communications of Distance
Threshold Registration Phase is shown in Figure 7.
Step DR1:
1) MUi decides a distance threshold Dfui beyond which
MUi does not allow his/her social friends to find him-
self in a friends’ location query.
2) MUi sends encrypted distance registration message
Msg1dreg = 〈ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| Dfui || RNui || TSui ||
Rflag = 1), H (IDi|| RNui || TSui ), TSui〉.
Here, RNui , TSui , H (·) and E(·) convey their meaning as
tabulated in Table 1. Rflag = 1 indicates that this message in
intended for the distance threshold registration.
Step DR2:




2) CT verifies if |TS∗ui − TSui |
?
≤ 1T , where TS∗ui is the
current timestamp. If verification holds, go to step 3,
else terminate and exit.
3) CT computes the hash valueH (IDi|| RNui || TSui ). If the
computed and received hash values are same, then go
to step 4, else discards the message and exit .
4) CT logs in to LSSNSj and establishes the shared session
key SKCT ,Sj as explained in subsection V-C.
5) CT encrypts and sends the distance registration mes-
sage as Msg2dreg = 〈ESKCT ,Sj (IDi|| Dfui || RNui || RNct ||
TSct || Rflag = 1), H (IDi|| RNct || TSct ), TSct 〉 to
LSSNSj.
Step DR3:
1) LSSNSj decrypts Msg2dreg using the session key
SKSj,CT .
2) LSSNSj verifies communication delay using the
received and current timestamp values.
3) LSSNSj verifies message integrity and authenticity by
computing and comparing hash values with decrypted
parameters.
4) If verifications of steps (2) and (3) are successful, go to
Step 5, else terminate the session and exit .
5) LSSNSj saves record {IDi,Dfui } and sends response
message Msg1resp = ESKCT ,Sj (IDi ||RNui ||RNct ||‘ok
′)
to CT .
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FIGURE 8. Message communication in user location update phase. Please
refer to Section V-E.
Step DR4:
1) CT decryptsMsg1resp using the shared session key.
2) CT verifies the received random number RNct and
sends Msg2resp = ESKCT ,MUi (IDi||RNui ||‘ok
′) to MUi.
3) MUi decrypts the message Msg2resp using the shared
session key SKMUi,CT
4) MUi verifies the random numberRNui . If these verifica-
tion holds, go to step 5.Otherwise, termiate the session
and exit .
5) MUi reads ‘ok ′ message and distance registration pro-
cess successfully terminates.
E. THE USER LOCATION UPDATE PHASE
In this subsection, we describe how mOSN userMUi updates
his current location to the Location Sharing Social Network
Server LSSNSj and the message communications of User
Location Update Phase is shown in Figure 8. The location
updation is done through the cellular tower CT , following the
steps as mentioned in subsection V-B, MUi makes a secure
login to CT and mutually estabsishes a shared session key
SKMUi,CT (= SKCT ,MUi ). Next, it executes the following
steps:
Step LU1:
1) MUi selects a one-time 128-bit random number RNui .
2) MUi uses the shared session key SKMUi,CT and sends
an encrypted message Msg1 = ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| xui ||
yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui )|| RNui || TSui ) to CT .
3) MUi sends a hash value H1 = H (IDi|| xui || yui ||
EKMUi,F (xui , yui )|| RNui || TSui ) to CT .
Note that, (xui , yui ) is the current location of MUi, and
EKMUi,F (xui , yui ) is the current location of MUi encrypted
with the symmetric key {KMUi,F }, mutually shared between
MUi and all trusted friend F .
Step LU2:
1) CT receives location update message {Msg1,H1} from
MUi.
2) CT uses SKCT ,MUi and decrypts Msg1 as
DSKCT ,MUi (Msg1).
3) CT retrieves parameters IDi, (xui , yui ), EKMUi,F (xui ,
yui ), RNui and TSui respectively (from step 2).
4) CT verifies if |TS∗ui − TSui |
?
≤ 1T , where TS∗ui is
the current timestamp. If the verification holds then go
to step LU3, else discards the received message and
exit .
Step LU3:
1) CT uses the decrypted parameter and computes a hash
valueH2 =H (IDi|| xui || yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui )|| RNui ||
TSui ).
2) CT verifies if H2
?
= H1. If the verification holds then
go to step 3, else terminate the session and exit .
3) CT confirms the authenticity and integrity of the mes-
sage and makes a login to LSSNSj.
4) CT and LSSNSj establishes a mutually shared session
key SKCT ,Sj as mentioned in subsection V-C.
Step LU4:
1) CT generates L − 1 dummy locations and L −






2) CT randomly putMUi’s real updated location informa-
tion string at the nth place among the dummy informa-
tion set, (1 ≤ n ≤ L).
3) The sequence number of MUi’s real location update
information is encrypted by CT with its own master
secret key X0 , i.e., Indexui = EX0 [Sequence(xui || yui ||
EKMUi,F (xui , yui ))].
Step LU5:













2) CT generates a 128-bit random number RNct .
3) sends {LSSNSj, ESKCT ,Sj (Msg2|| RNct || TSct ),
H (LSSNSj|| Msg2|| RNct ),TSct } to server LSSNSj.
Step LU6:
1) LSSNSj uses its session key SKSj,CT (shared with CT )
and decrypts the messageMsg2, random number RNct ,
and timestamp TSct .
2) LSSNSj checks the transmission delay using the
received and current timestamps.
3) LSSNSj checks message integrity by checking comput-
ing a fresh hash value from the decrypted parameters.
4) LSSNSj updates the user location and sends Msg3 =
ESKSj,CT (IDi||LSSNSj||RNct ||‘ok
′) to CT .
Step LU7:
1) CT uses the session key SKCT ,Sj and decryptsMsg3.
2) CT verifies the correctness ofRNct . If it is correct, go to
step 3, else terminate the session and exit.
3) CT forwards ‘ok ′ to MUi.
The user location update phase is summarized in Figure 9.
Remark 2: When the user reaches a new place, he/she
updates his/her location in the LSSNS’s database to ensure
that LSSNS knows the user’s real-time location. MUi exe-
cutes the user location update phase and sends the current
location coordinate (xui , yui ) (obtained by GPS) to LSSNS.
As the user location update phase of our proposed scheme is
based only on the private key encryption, cryptographic hash
function and xor operation, it is both secure and lightweight.
Table 4 reveals that considering all the entities, this location
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FIGURE 9. User location update phase of the proposed scheme.
update process takes only 0.0721 second. Hence, LSSNS can
update the current location of MUi very quickly.
Depending on the population density, potential users,
etc., the LTE technology nowadays requires cellular towers
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FIGURE 10. The message communication in friends’ locations query
phase. Please refer to Section V-F.
(or BTSs) to be spaced in the range of 2km to 5km [50].
When the mOSN user MUi moves to a new cellular tower
zone, he/she needs to register to CT . Once the registration
is complete, MUi provides his/her location update to LSSNS
and access other location-based services from LSSNS. This
mobile user registration process is a one-time task and incurs
very small computation cost on a mobile device. As presented
in Figure 2 and Table 3, MUi registration has the computation
cost of 5*TH + 5*TX + TFE , which essentially takes only
0.0656 second. This evidences that the user registration pro-
cess is very efficient.
F. THE FRIENDS’ LOCATIONS QUERY PHASE
In this subsection, we describe how MUi achieves his/her
social friends’ identity and location, who are willing to share
their information. The message communications of Friends’
Locations Query Phase is shown in Figure 10.
Step FLQ1:
1) MUi makes a secure login to CT and mutually estab-
lishes a shared session key SKMUi,CT (= SKCT ,MUi )
(As explained in subsection V-B).
2) MUi sends {ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| F || qfui ||TSui ⊕ RNui ),
H (IDi|| F || qfui ||RNui ),TSui} to CT .
Note that the messageF is a request to find ‘friends’. TSui ,
RNui , E(·) andH (·) convey their usual meanings as explained
in Table 1.
Step FLQ2:
1) CT receives request from MUi, and checks if |TS∗ui −
TSui |
?
≤ 1T . Here, TS∗ui is the current timestamp. If the
verification holds, go to step 2, else exit .
2) CT uses its session key SKCT ,MUi (shared with MUi)
to decrypt the encrypted user message.
3) CT uses received timestamp TSui and parameter TSui




4) CT computes hash valueH3 = H (IDi||F || qfui ||RN ′ui ).
If the computed H3 and the received hash value does
not match, then CT rejects the request immediately.
Otherwise, go to step 5.
5) CT logs in to the server LSSNSj and creates
a shared session key SKCT ,Sj , as explained in
subsection V-C.
6) Through a public channel, CT forwards {ESKCT ,Sj (IDi
||F || qfui ||TSct ⊕ RN newct ), H (IDi|| F || qfui || RN newct ),
TSct } to LSSNSj.
Step FLQ3:
1) LSSNSj receives the message from CT and decrypts
the message using its session key SKSj,CT (shared with
CT ).
2) LSSNSj checks the communication delay using current
timestamp TS∗ct and the received timestamp TSct . if ver-
ification holds, go to step 3, else terminate the session
and exit .
3) LSSNSj retrieves RN newct and computes fresh hash value
with the decrypted parameter and compares with the
received hash value.
4) If verification holds, go to step FLQ4, else terminate
the session and exit.
Step FLQ4:
1) LSSNSj finds the set 2 containing a database entry for
all friends ofMUi.
2) LSSNSj finds whether δ((xp, yp), (xuit , yuit )) ≤
min(qfui , dfs)s∈2, p = 1, · · · , k, and t = 1, · · · , k,
where δ(·) is the distance function and (xuit , yuit ) are
one real and k−1 fake locations ofMUi. Here, database
entry of IDi is excluded.
3) For all friends α ∈ 2, LSSNSj includes record
(α, (p, enc∗p), Indexα) in the result set if the coordinate
(xαit , yαit ) meets the distance requirement.
4) Corresponding to k coordinate entries of MUi
(xui , yui )i=1···k , LSSNSj prepares k subsets {Fi}i=1···k
and adds them to result set.
5) LSSNSj uses RN newct (the random number sent by CT ),
TSSj (the current timestamp) and encrypts the result set
using the shared session key SKSj,CT .
6) Through public channel, LSSNSj forwards message
〈ESKSj,CT ({Fi}i=1···k , Indexui ,RN
new
ct ),H (({Fi}i=1···k )||
RN newct || TSSj ), TSSj〉 to CT .
Step FLQ5:
1) CT receives the encrypted result set from LSSNSj.
2) CT decrypts it using own shared session key SKCT ,Sj
to obtain {Fi}i=1···k , Indexui , and RN newct .
3) CT verifies transmission delay by comparing the cur-
rent timestamp TS∗Sj and the received timestamp TSSj .
4) CT verifies the value of received RN newct with stored
RN newct .
5) If both verification of step 3 and 4 is successful, then
go to step FLQ6, else exit.
Step FLQ6:
1) CT decrypts Indexui as DX0 (Indexui ) = DX0
(EX0 (Seq(xui || yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui )))) and retrieves
the real sequence number γ . CT uses its master secret
key for the decryption.
2) CT discurds all records {Fi}i6=γ and accepts only Fγ .
3) CT finds every present user U in the dataset Fγ .
4) CT decrypts IndexU and finds its real center point
location γU .
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TABLE 2. Notations and their descriptions used in BAN logic.
5) CT retrieves encγU = EKMUi,F (xU , yU ) and prepares
answer setR.
6) CT sends the friend set R = ({IDUi ,EKMUi,F (xU ,
yU )}i=1...k ′ ) to MUi.
Remark 3: The existing location sharing schemes for OSN
suffer from multiple security drawbacks. The purpose of our
research is to design a secure and efficient location shar-
ing scheme for OSN. User location updates and friend’s
location queries are two essential operations for location
sharing services. As mentioned in existing location sharing
schemes [28], [29], [34], group key-establishment among a
user and its trusted social friends is an intrinsic require-
ments. In the literature, several group key distribution and
key-establishment schemes among social friends have been
proposed in distributed online social networks [51]–[54].
Unlike those schemes, our proposed one is not designed
for purpose group key distribution and key-establishment
among social friends. That said, the key-establishment pro-
cess among social friends advocated by Y. Jung et al. [51] and
L. Guo et al. [54] can be adapted to work with our proposed
scheme.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide the detail security analysis of the
proposed scheme. This is done in two ways. First, we present
the authentication proof Using Burrows-Abadi-Needham
(BAN) logic. Second, we present an informal security anal-
ysis to logically explain how and why the proposed scheme
resists various security attacks.
A. AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
BAN logic is used to analyze the security of any authentica-
tion scheme to verify the secure transmission between two
communicating parties of that network [55]. In this section,
we use BAN logic to show that the proposed scheme actu-
ally achieves the authentication goals. The basic syntax and
semantics of BAN logic are explained in Table 2.
The main logical postulates of the BAN logic are defined by
a set of laws or rules as listed below [55], [56].






• Law 2 (Nonce Verification Law (NVL)).
Q|≡#(S),Q|≡R|vS
Q|≡R|≡S .
• Law 3 (Freshness Conjuncatenation Law (FCL)).
Q|≡#(S)
Q|≡#(S,T ) .
• Law 4 (Jurisdiction Law (JL)).
Q|≡R⇒S,Q|≡R|≡S
Q|≡S .







In order to show that the proposed scheme ensures authen-
tication, two goals, as mentioned in the following, must be
achieved.
Goal 1: MUi |≡ (MUi
SK
←→ CT ).
Goal 2: CT |≡ (MUi
SK
←→ CT ).
In the proposed scheme, there will be two basic types of
messages as follows:
Message 1: MUi → CT : { TID∗i , H (H (IDi ⊕ xCTui ||x0))
⊕ui⊕ Tui ⊕H (IDCT ), Tui , H1}.
Message 2: CT → MUi: {BCTUi⊕ ct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi, Tct ,
H3}.
The above generic messages have to be converted
to idealized messages. These idealized messages are as
follows.
Message 1: MUi → CT : {TIDi, Tui , 〈IDi, xCTUi , ui , Tui ,
H (IDCT )〉x0 , H1}.
Message 2: CT → A : {Tct , 〈ct Tct , IDi, 〉x0 , H3}.
With the following assumptions, the authentication proof
of our proposed scheme is presented as follows:
A.1:MUi |≡ #(Tct );









A.5:MUi |≡ CT ⇒ (IDct , ct , Tct );
A.6: CT |≡ MUi ⇒ (IDi, ui , Tui );
A.7:MUi |≡ Tui ;
A.8:MUi |≡ ui ;
A.9:MUi |≡ IDi;
A.10:MUi |≡ IDCT ;
A.11: CT |≡ Tct ;
A.12: CT |≡ ct ;
A.13: CT |≡ IDCT .
Next, we shall show that two goals mentioned earlier can
be achieved using the assumptions, idealized messages and
Basic BAN logic laws.
From the first message, we may obtain the
following.
• S1: CT C {IDi, Tui , 〈IDi, xCTui , ui , Tui , H (IDCT )〉x0 ,
H1}.
• S2: Using AL, we derive: CT C 〈IDi, xCTui , ui ,
Tui ,H (IDCT )〉x0 .
• S3: According to A.4 and MML, we obtain, CT |≡
MUi |v (IDi, xCTui , ui , Tui ,H (IDCT )).
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• S4: According to A.2 and FCL, we get, CT |≡ #(IDi,
xCTui , ui , Tui ,H (IDCT )).
• S5: According to NVL, we have, CT |≡ MUi |≡ (IDi,
xCTui , ui , Tui ,H (IDCT )).
• S6: Using A.6 and JL, we get, CT |≡ (IDi, xCTui , ui ,
Tui ,H (IDCT )).
• S7: From S6 and AL, we obtain, CT |≡ ui , CT |≡ Tui ,
CT |≡ IDi.
• S8: According toA.11, A.12, A.13, we get,CT |≡ IDCT ,
CT |≡ Tct and CT |≡ ct .
• S9: Since SKCT ,MUi = H (IDi ||IDCT ||BCTui || P1||ct
||Tui ||Tct ) and the results in Steps S7 and S8 give CT |≡
(MUi
SKCT ,MUi
←→ CT ). (Goal 2)
• S10: Using the message 2 and AL, we obtain, MUi C 〈
ct , Tct 〉x0 .
• S11: According to A.3 and MML, we get, MUi |≡
CT |v (ct , Tct ).
• S12: Using A.1 and FCL, we obtain,MUi |≡ #(ct , Tct ).
• S13: Using NVL, we obtain,MUi |≡ CT |≡ (ct , Tct ).
• S14: A.5 and JL giveMUi |≡ (ct , Tct ).
• S15: According to S14 and AL, we have, MUi |≡ ct ,
MUi |≡ Tct .
• S16: According to A.7-A.10, we obtain, MUi |≡ IDi,
MUi |≡ IDCT , MUi |≡ Tui , MUi |≡ ct .
• S17: The results of Steps S15 and S16 give MUi |≡
(MUi
SKCT ,MUi
←→ CT ). (Goal 1)
Consequently, both the goals are achieved to ensure
that mutual authentication between MUi and CT is
established.
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present an informal analysis of the security
of the proposed scheme. This analysis aims to logically show
that our scheme can successfully defend against the following
known attacks.
1) THE REPLAY ATTACK
In the proposed scheme, two message communications are
needed by the login phase and the authentication phase. In the
process of login, MUi sends Msg1 = {TID∗i ,M1,H1, Tui}
to CT , whereas in authentication phase, CT sends Msg2 =
{M2, H3, Tct } to MUi. CT does not accept Msg1 if |T ∗ui −
Tui | ≥ 1T . Additionally, CT computes H2 = H (IDi ||M1
||P1 ||Tui ) and checks whether H2=H1 or not. This com-
putation is crucial to prevent a replay attack. The cellular
tower CT rejects any request for log-in if this checking does
not succeed. We have explained in Step LA5 in Section V-B,
of themOSNuser login, authentication and key establishment
phase how an attacker cannot succeed in replaying the authen-
tication messageMsg2. Moreover, CT also stores parameters
〈IDi, ui , Tui〉 in its repository. In case CT receives another





it first checks whether Tun is valid or not. If it is found to
be valid, CT gies on to check whether the extracted TID∗n =
TIDn⊕ H (IDCT ||Tun ) is the same as the TIDn stored in
its repository for the same IDn. If they are the same, Msgn1
is considered being a replay message. Thus, our proposed
scheme is capable of resisting a strong replay attack with the
help of current timestamp and a random nonce.
2) THE MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
An adversary A may attempt to modify login or authentica-
tion message through a man-in-the-middle attack. In order
to execute this attack, A set up an independent parallel
connection with both MUi and CT for a specific session.
Additionally, to invalidate the login request of an authorized
user, the attacker may modify some parameters from the
request message. In the proposed scheme, the credentials of
both login and authentication message, such as IDCT , RID0 ,
AUiCT , etc. are generated with fuzzy extractor, hash function,
bitwise XOR and random nonce. This makes adversary A
very difficult to regenerate and modify. As a consequence,
the proposed scheme can resist the man-in-the-middle attack.
3) THE STOLEN/LOST MOBILE DEVICE ATTACK
Suppose the mobile device of the user MUi has been stolen
or lost, an adversary can easily find P1i and P
2
i , which are
stored in the memory of the device. However, IDi, PWi,
and biometric ηi are not stored directly in the device. From
stored P1i = H (PWi|| ηi) ⊕n and P
2
i = H (IDi ||PWi ||ηi
||n), it is computationally infeasible to identify or predict all
these parameters. Furthermore, P1i and P
2
i are masked with
a random number n and the collision-resistant hash function
H (·). This makes it a computationally infeasible problem
to predict all the credentials in polynomial time. Therefore,
the proposed scheme resists this type of attacks.
4) THE OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
As describe in Section V-B, a mobile user MUi needs the
identity IDi and password PWi for its login. An adversary can
obtain the P1i and P
2
i from the lost or stolen mobile device, but
it cannot guess and compute identity IDi, password PWi, and
biometric ηi at the same time as it is computationally infea-
sible. Hence, this scheme can prevent the offline password
guessing attack.
5) KNOWN KEY SECRECY/FORWARD SECRECY
An adversary may obtain the current session key, but with
that compromised session key, it cannot compute previous
session keys. As per the proposed scheme, the session key is
computed as SKCT ,MUi = SKMUi,CT = H (IDi ||IDCT ||BCTUi
||P1 ||ct ||Tui ||Tct ) where AUiCT = BCTUi = H (H (IDi
⊕xCTUi ) ||X0).With the use ofi, Tui ,j, and Tuj , a new login
key for each session, SKCT ,MUi = SKMUi,CT is generated
freshly and uniquely. So, the key cannot be used further in
future. Moreover, before establishing a session key, bothMUi
and CT mutually validated each other. Hence, the proposed
scheme confirms that the leakage of temporal information
does not break the secrecy of the session key and it provides
the session key security.
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TABLE 3. Computation cost of the proposed scheme.
6) USER ANONYMITY
In this proposed scheme, the anonymity property of any
mobile user is maintained. An adversary may eavesdrop a
login or authentication message communicated betweenMUi
and CT , but adversary cannot get the original IDi from
those messages. At the time of login MUi send Msg1 =
{TID∗i ,M1,H1, Tui} to cellular tower CT . Instead of its orig-
inal identityMUi send its temporary identity TIDi embedded
in TID∗i = TIDi⊕ H (IDCT || Tui ), which is valid for only one
session. Furthermore, it is not possible to compute IDi from
M1 = AUiCT⊕ui⊕ Tui⊕H (IDCT ) andH1 =H (IDi||M1||
ui || Tui ). At the time of authentication, CT transmits back
a authentication response message Msg2 = {M2, H3, Tct }
to MUi where M2 = BCTUi⊕ ct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi and H3 =
H (IDi ||P1 ||ct ||Tui ||Tct ||SKCT ,MUi ). So, from any intrude
message, it is not feasible to figure out the original IDi by
an adversary. Thus, the proposed scheme can preserve the
anonymity property of any user.
7) THE PARALLEL SESSION AND REFLECTION ATTACK
In the proposed scheme, an adversary cannot start a new
session with CT using any fake identity, obtaining from
any eavesdropped messages Msg1 = {TID∗i ,M1,H1, Tui}.
As described in section V-B, an adversary cannot obtain the
correct identity IDi, password PWi or the biometric key ηi of
any legal userMUi with an offline password guessing attack.
Hence, from any eavesdropped message, an attacker cannot
create a valid login request message Msg1, so a new session
with CT as a legal user not possible. Thus, our proposed
scheme can protect the parallel session and reflection attacks.
8) SESSION KEY SECURITY
For establishing a new session, a mutually computed session
key SKMUi,CT (= SKCT ,MUi ) is shared betweenMUi and CT .
The session key is computed as follows:
SKCT ,MUi = H (IDi||IDCT ||BCTUi ||P1||ct ||Tui ||Tct )
= H (IDi||IDCT ||AUiCT ||P1||ct ||Tui ||Tct )
= H (IDi||IDCT ||AUiCT ||ui ||ct ||Tui ||Tct )
= H (IDi||IDCT ||AUiCT ||ui ||P2||Tui ||Tct )
= SKMUi,CT
Both MUi and CT authenticate each other to compute the
mutually shared session key. Moreover, an adversary needs
the credentials IDi, IDCT , BCTUi = (AUiCT ) for computing
session keys. Therefore, the session keys are fully secured in
our proposed scheme.
9) THE EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE ATTACK
An adversary may obtain the temporary (ephemeral) secrets
(e.g., random variable) of any session from a compromised
mobile device if those are not deleted properly. In this kind
of attacks, with the mentioned information, an attacker can
initiate an ephemeral secret leakage attack. As per our pro-
posed scheme, our session key is generated as follows:
SKMUi,CT = H (IDi ||IDCT ||AUiCT ||ui ||P2 ||Tui ||Tct )
where AUiCT = V
′
CTUi
⊕ (H (IDi|| H (PWi|| n′ ||ηi))). ui is a
128-bit random number there. With this single random num-
ber, an attacker cannot regenerate the session key SKMUi,CT ,
as it requires some other credentials, such as IDi, IDCT ,
PWi etc. Thus, our scheme can defend the ephemeral secret
leakage attack.
10) THE USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In the user impersonation attack, an adversary pretends itself
as an authorized user to the cellular tower. So, for login,
an adversary needs the credentials value of IDi, PWi, B′i.
As it is already discussed that in our proposed scheme, these
credentials are not sent directly through the public channel
or saved in the device memory, or it is computationally
infeasible to obtain them from the easily available informa-
tion. If an adversary wants to send a login message Msg1
= {TID∗i ,M1,H1, Tui} to CT , it needs to compute TID
∗
i
(= TIDi⊕ H (IDCT || Tui ) and M1 = AUiCT⊕ ui⊕ Tui⊕
H (IDCT ). After receiving the login request, with the help
of timestamp value Tui and the random variable AUiCT , CT
can determine if the received message Msg1 is original or
replayed. Therefore, with invalid IDi, PWi, and B′i, it is not
possible to generate or modify Msg1. Thus, our proposed
scheme can defend the user impersonation attack.
11) THE SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In the server impersonation attack, an attacker may pre-
tend itself as a genuine server. In our proposed scheme,
after receiving valid login request message, a cellular tower
CT replies back with an authorization message Msg2 =
{M2, H3, Tct } toMUi. For calculatingM2(= BCTUi⊕ ct⊕
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FIGURE 11. Code for channel declarations, keys, constants, functions,
equations, queries and events.
Tct⊕ IDi) and hash value H3(= H (IDi ||P1 ||ct ||Tui ||Tct
||SKCT ,MUi )), an attacker needs the secret key, X0 of the
cellular tower and the random number xCTUi as BCTUi =
H (H (IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||X0). Hence, our proposed scheme can
resist the server impersonation attack.
12) THE PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
This kind of attacks is launched by an internal user who
may be authorized to use the system that is attacked. Sup-
pose that an adversary, who is an internal user also, obtains
the registration credentials IDi, (MPWBi ⊕ λ) from the
mobile registration request Msg1. However, as discussed in
section V-B, it is not feasible to compute the PWi and the
biometric key ηi = even if the adversary has that lost or
stolen mobile device. Without the knowledge of λ, it also
not possible to calculateMPWBi from (MPWBi⊕ λ). So, our
scheme can resist this type of attacks.
VII. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING PROVERIF
In this section, we present the formal security verification
of the proposed scheme using based ProVerif simulation
tool [57]. This tool is based on applied pi calculus and can
be used to verify whether an attacker can attack the session
key [48]. We have modelled the proposed scheme in ProVerif
and corresponding the source codes have been presented
in Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14.
In Figure 11, the code for channel declarations is pre-
sented along with the definition of constants, free vari-
ables,functions, equations, queries and events, which are
FIGURE 12. Code in ProVerif for the process of MUi , the i th mobile user.
FIGURE 13. Code in ProVerif for the process of CT .
needed to model the proposed scheme. Figure 12 depicts
the ProVerif code for mobile user MU registration, login,
authentication and key-establishment process with CT . Cel-
lular tower registration process (CTReg) and authentication
process (CTAuth) have been presented as a parallel composi-
tion in Figure 13.
Finally, we execute the codes given in the previous three
Figures in the latest version (1.93) of ProVerif simulation tool.
The results of session key secrecy (from the user as well as
cellular tower) and authentication are presented in Figure 14.
The following observations can be drawn from the results.
• RESULT inj-event (UserAuth(id)) ==> inj-event
(UserStart(id)) is true.
• RESULT not attacker(SKmuct[]) is true.
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TABLE 4. Communication cost of the proposed scheme.
FIGURE 14. Results of the ProVerif simulation and their analysis.
• RESULT not attacker(SKctmu[]) is true.
From the result set mentioned above, we conclude that the
proposed scheme passes the required security verification.
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the computation and communi-
cation cost of our proposed scheme. It is to be noted that
the proposed scheme avoids cryptographic operations such as
bilinear pairing, elliptic curve point multiplication operation
etc., as they incur high computation overhead.
A. COMPUTATION COST ANALYSIS
Table 5 shows various cryptographic operations, correspond-
ing notations and their execution time on an Intel Pentium4
2600 MHz processor with 1024 MB RAM, as performed
in [39], [63]. Due to the fuzzy extractor Rep(·) function for
TABLE 5. Various notations used and their time complexity.
extracting the biometric key αi, we require TFE ≈ TM [64].
Symmetric encryption/decryption has been given for a AES-
128 symmetric cryptosystem. The mobile user registration
and LSSNS Registration mechanism is a one-time process.
As a result, we have not considered the computation cost of
the registration phases. In Table 3 we have tabulated the com-
putational overhead for the main three entities of our scheme
MUi, CT and LSSNSj. ForMUi, during login phase overhead
is 10*TH + 10*TX + TFE . Since bitwise XOR operation,
TX time is negligible, the overhead will be 10 ∗ TH + TFE .
For the authentication, required overhead of CT will be 7 ∗
TH + 8 ∗ TX ≈ 7 ∗ TH . Hence, overall computation cost of
mobile user login and authentication phase is 17∗TH+TFE =
17∗0.5+1∗63.08= 71.58ms. Following the same procedure,
we calculate the computation cost and the exact execution
time of all other remaining phases of the proposed scheme
and tabulate them in Table 3.
B. COMMUNICATION COST ANALYSIS
In order to calculate the overall communication overhead of
our proposed scheme, we have assumed standard bit sizes
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TABLE 6. Security and functionality comparison.
TABLE 7. Storage analysis of the proposed scheme.
of various parameters and cryptographic function outputs.
As an example, the bit size of used identity, random num-
bers and timestamp are 160, 128 and 32 bits respectively.
The size of output of hash function H (·) is 160 bits, (if
we use SHA-1 hash function [65]) and output of symmetric
encryption/decryption (for example, Advanced Encryption
Standard or AES-128 [66]) is 128 bits and the prime number
is 160 bits. For mobile user login and authentication in our
proposed scheme, twomessage communications are required.
In step ULA2 of Section V-B, CT receives the login request
message from mobile user MUi. In step ULA4, CT sends
one authentication response message to the MUi. The com-
munication cost for transmission of the MUi login message
{TID∗i ,M1,H1, Tui} requires (160 + 160 + 160 + 32)=512
bits and authentication response message {M2, H3, Tct }
requires (160 + 160 + 32) = 352 bits. In the same fashion,
we calculate the communication cost of messages communi-
cated in various other phases of the proposed scheme. Table 4
shows the detailed communication cost for different phases.
TABLE 8. Comparison of communication costs.
C. STORAGE OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
We have three different entities in our scheme - mobile
device (MUi), cellular tower(CT ) and location sharing social
network server(LSSNSj). We have calculated the storage
requirement for each of them separately. The lengths of some
important parameters that are needed to calculate the storage
space are as follows:
Device identity or serial number:: 160 bit
Output of a secured one way hash function H (·):: 160 bit
Session key:: 160 bit
One random number, r :: 128 bit
Master secret key, X0:: 1024-bit
Secret key, xCTUi :: 1024-bit
Fuzzy Extractor, µi:: 128 bit
According to our proposed scheme, a mobile device MUi





, RIDi, RID′0 ,
SKMUi,CT . Hence, the required storage space of MUi is =
128 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 = 1088 bit.
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TABLE 9. Comparison of computational costs among related schemes.
A cellular tower, CT , needs minimum {X0 + IDCT +
IDi + TIDi + xCTUi + IDSj + SNj + r + SKCT ,MUi +
SKCT ,Sj ) = 1024 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 1024 + 160 +
160 + 128 + 160 + 160} = 3296 bit storage space to
complete its processing. LSSNSj requires {E1 + TX0 (Kj) +
E2 + fSj + SKSj,CT } = 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 +
160 = 800 bit. Table 7 shows the storage analysis of our
proposed scheme.
IX. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARATIVE STUDY
In this section, we present a comparative study of our pro-
posed scheme with some recent chaotic-map based user
authentication schemes under multi-server environment, such
as schemes proposed by C. C. Lee et al. [58], X. Li et al. [59],
Tsai-Lo [60], Irshad et al. [61] and H. Wang et al. [62]. The
comparative study includes detail analysis and comparison
in terms of security and functionality features, computation
overheads and communication overheads.
In Table 6, we have tabulated an overall security and func-
tionality features comparison among our proposed scheme
and other related authentication and key-establishment
schemes. It is seen that a large number of the recent schemes
do not support three-factor authentication, as they do not
include user biometrics [43]. The tabulation result reveals
that the existing schemes suffer from various security attacks
like stolen smart card attack [60], [61], server imperson-
ation attack [58], session key recovery attack [61] and login
phase inefficiency [58]. Moreover, it is observed that these
chaotic-map based authentication schemes can not support
proper location-sharing and friends’ locations query feature.
It is clear from Table 6 that the proposed scheme overcomes
such security and functionality weaknesses of the existing
schemes.
In Table 9, we tabulate and compare the computa-
tion overheads of the proposed scheme with the relevant
schemes [58]–[61], [62]. The mobile user registration phase
and the location sharing social network server registration
phase are an one-time process only. Hence, for calculation as
well as comparison of communication cost, we consider only
user and server login, authentication and key-establishment
phases for the proposed and related schemes. Table 5 shows
various cryptographic operations, corresponding notations
and their execution time on an Intel Pentium4 2600 MHz
processor with 1024 MB RAM, as performed in [39], [63].
For all the given schemes, we separately tabulated compu-
tation for the user, server and the registration center or the
cellular tower. Also, in Table 9, wemention and compare total
computation cost for each relevant scheme.
It is observed that total computation cost of our proposed
scheme is ≈ 117.122 ms only, whereas computation cost of
C. C. Lee et al.’s scheme [58] is ≈ 131.62 ms, X. Li et al.’s
scheme [59] is ≈ 135.62 ms, Tsai-Lo’s scheme [60] is
≈ 95.58 ms, Irshad et al.’s scheme [61] is ≈ 140.62 ms
and H. Wang et al.’s scheme [62] is ≈ 178.04 ms. It is to
be noted that, except Tsai-Lo’s scheme, we have the lowest
computation cost. The reason behind such low computation
cost of our proposed schemes is that, we use only two chaotic
map operations for authentication and key-establishment pur-
pose, which is the minimum among other related existing
schemes.
Table 8 shows and compares message communication
rounds and communication cost (in bits) of the proposed
scheme with related schemes [58]–[61], [62]. Since the
user and server registration phasesare executed only once,
we consider only user and server login, authentication &
key-establishment phases for calculation of communication
cost for the proposed scheme and other schemes. In our
proposed scheme, mOSN user and location server login and
authentication phase needs 864 bits and 992 bits of message
communication respectively, with a total communication cost
of 1856 bits. From Table 8, it is clear that, compared to all
related scheme, except C. C. Lee et al.’s scheme [58], the pro-
posed scheme has the minimum communication cost. Unfor-
tunately, as shown in Table 6, C. C. Lee et al.’s scheme is
vulnerable to some serious security attacks. Overall, the pro-
posed scheme is both efficient and provides much greater
security and functionality features for the smart devices as
compared to all existing compared schemes.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an efficient location sharing scheme for
mOSNs and shows the ability to resist various active and pas-
sive security attacks that are present in the existing schemes.
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The proposed scheme integrates LBS and SNS into a set of
single entity servers, thereby reducing their internal commu-
nication overhead. Our location sharing scheme for mOSNs
shows both efficiency and flexibility in location update, shar-
ing, and query of social friends and social strangers. For-
mal security verification, authentication proof and simulation
results prove the security strength of the proposed scheme.
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